The rapid expansion of the Haiyu group in Mozambique<\/strong><\/p>\nFrom 2019 to 2025: In less than six years, the Haiyu group, believed to be majority-owned by Chinese capital, has established a network of mining companies in Mozambique, spread across the provinces of Nampula and Inhambane. Commercial documents obtained and analysed during this investigation reveal a consistent pattern: multiple subsidiaries, almost identical corporate structures and centralised control from foreign entities. The CJI\u2019s analysis is based on 17 commercial certificates, statutory amendments and administrative records, enabling the reconstruction of the group\u2019s trajectory from its entry into the country in 2019 to its recent reorganisation in 2025.<\/p>\n
The geographical expansion of the Haiyu group\u2019s operations in Mozambique coincides with areas where the current President, Daniel Chapo, previously held administrative posts. Chapo was district administrator in Nacala-a-Velha (2009) and Palma (2015), before being appointed Governor of Inhambane Province in 2016, a post he held until his presidential candidacy in 2024. Some of the areas where the group has established mining operations are located in these same regions or in areas under his former administrative jurisdiction. To date, there is no public evidence establishing a direct link between the official and the group\u2019s operations. However, the geographical overlap raises pertinent questions about the institutional context in which these concessions were awarded.<\/p>\n
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Rapid and structured expansion<\/strong><\/p>\nThe first records of the Haiyu Group in Mozambique date back to 2019, with the incorporation of its first companies involved in mining. Since then, the number of companies associated with the group has grown steadily, in line with a strategy of territorial expansion.<\/p>\n
The companies identified are mainly concentrated in two regions: in Nampula, with several entities under similar names, and Vilankulo (Inhambane), where the group has also established a presence.<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/cjimoz.org.mz\/news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/a1.jpeg\")
A holding<\/p><\/div>\n
Among the companies analysed are:<\/strong><\/p>\nHaiyu (Mozambique) Mining Nampula I, II, III<\/p>\n
Haiyu (Mozambique) Mining Nampula X, SU, Lda<\/p>\n
Haiyu (MZ) Mining \u2013 Vilankulo<\/p>\n
Haiyu Vilankulo Mining Co., Lda<\/p>\n
The repetition of names and structures suggests a pattern of operational replication, frequently observed in groups with extractive activities across multiple concessions.<\/p>\n
A recurring model<\/strong><\/p>\nThe documents analysed in minute detail by the CJI indicate that the various companies follow a virtually identical corporate model. Generally, the capital structure consists of: i) a majority entity holding around 90% of the shares, linked to the Chinese company Hainan Haiyu Mining Co., Ltd, and ii) a minority stake of around 10%, associated with entities registered in Hong Kong.<\/p>\n
This model is repeated across several companies, suggesting a centralised organisation, despite the multitude of formally distinct companies. According to the records, effective control of operations remains concentrated in the Chinese entity.<\/p>\n
The same names, various companies<\/strong><\/p>\nAnother pattern identified is the repetition of directors across the different companies. Among the names that appear frequently are: Hefeng Dong, Juyi Li, Li Zhou and Zhou Li<\/p>\n
The recurring presence of the same directors in various companies may indicate strategic coordination and centralised management.<\/p>\n
Recent changes and reorganisation<\/strong><\/p>\nFrom 2024 onwards, the documents point to significant changes in the group\u2019s structure in Mozambique. Among the changes identified are: share capital increases, amendments to the articles of association and the creation of new entities, including a sole proprietorship.\u00a0 In 2025, this development culminates in an apparent reorganisation of the group, with the introduction of new legal structures.<\/p>\n
According to the documentary analysis, these changes may be linked to internal restructuring, adaptation to new concessions and asset segmentation.<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/cjimoz.org.mz\/news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/IMG_9707-scaled.jpg\")
Foto: Estacio Valoi\/ It is like a highway\/Vilankulo<\/p><\/div>\n
\n<\/strong>Geographical expansion and resources<\/strong><\/p>\nThe simultaneous presence in Nampula and Vilankulo suggests a strategy focused on coastal areas with mineral potential. Although the commercial documents do not directly detail the concessions associated with each company, the geographical distribution and sequential establishment of companies indicate a possible link to the exploitation of specific resources.<\/p>\n
Patterns that raise questions<\/strong><\/p>\nAn analysis of the records does not, in itself, reveal any documentary irregularities. However, several factors warrant closer scrutiny: the sequential establishment of multiple companies with identical structures; the concentration of control in foreign entities; the systematic repetition of directors; and the use of intermediary entities registered in Hong Kong<\/p>\n
These patterns are consistent with complex corporate structures used in international operations, particularly in sectors of high economic value.<\/p>\n
At the heart of all this lies a question rarely asked directly: who decides the fate of these territories? Projects on this scale are not defined at the local level. They result from negotiations between the state, investors and technical bodies, often far removed from the communities that will live with the consequences. By the time information reaches the ground, the essentials have already been decided. The scope for participation becomes limited \u2014 and, at times, merely formal.<\/p>\n
Vilankulo thus becomes a focal point for various tensions: between the short and long term, between economic growth and sustainability, between national interest and local impact, between promise and reality.<\/p>\n
The Inhambane coast stands today at a crossroads. It can consolidate a model based on conservation and tourism, integrate fully into a global extractive economy, or attempt to reconcile both \u2014 a task which, in practice, has proven profoundly difficult when interests clash directly.<\/p>\n
Heavy sand mining fits this pattern perfectly. Long-term concessions, a strong presence of foreign capital, the export of raw materials with little local processing, and benefits concentrated outside the communities directly affected. The rhetoric accompanying these projects is familiar: job creation, boosting the local economy, increased revenue for the state. But the central issue is not what is promised. It is what remains afterwards.<\/p>\n
On the ground, the initial effects are already visible. Mining does indeed seem to create the promised jobs, particularly in the early stages, absorbing the local workforce in a context where opportunities are scarce. For many young people, it is the only immediate source of income. But this effect is short-lived. As the project progresses, mechanisation tends to increase, the need for manual labour decreases, and the more skilled roles are often filled by external technicians. The cycle repeats itself: rapid job creation, followed by a gradual reduction in employment and the concentration of value outside the community.<\/p>\n
At the same time, infrastructure begins to take shape that goes beyond the scale of local extraction. Plans for ports, roads and logistics corridors emerge as natural extensions of the mining project. Even when they remain at the conceptual stage, they reveal the true scale of the intervention: it is not merely a matter of extracting sand, but of integrating the coast into a global chain for the export of resources. The landscape is no longer defined by its ecological or tourist potential but is organised according to logistical efficiency.<\/p>\n
This process raises a structural question: what proportion of the wealth generated remains in the country \u2014 and, above all, in the communities directly affected? Experience accumulated in different contexts suggests a consistent pattern. Most of the value is captured elsewhere \u2014 in industrial processing, distribution chains and international markets. Locally, there remain limited jobs, tax revenues often reduced by incentives and exemptions, and concentrated environmental and social pressure.<\/p>\n
The problem is not merely economic. It is one of distribution. It is a question of the model itself!<\/p>\n
Before the expansion of large-scale extractive projects, other possibilities were discussed for the Inhambane coast. Models based on environmental conservation, sustainable tourism, the so-called blue economy \u2013 which the government appeared to advocate as recently as May 2026 \u2013 and even international financing mechanisms linked to ecosystem protection. These alternatives were based on a different logic: enhancing the value of the territory over time, whilst maintaining natural capital as a strategic asset. The choice of the extractive route represents a profound shift \u2014 replacing a model of gradual income generation with one of intensive and accelerated exploitation.<\/p>\n
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For local communities, this transition is not theoretical. It is experienced in daily life. On the one hand, there is anticipation: jobs, the circulation of money, the promise of development. On the other, uncertainty grows: loss of access to land, changes to ways of life, environmental degradation and a lack of clear guarantees about the future. The speed of change often outstrips the capacity for social and institutional adaptation.<\/p>\n
As is the case with other projects involving multinationals, consultants are paid to approve it and the communities are left high and dry.<\/p>\n
From our local sources and documents: \u201cThe Ministry of the Environment rejected this project. There are the documents submitted by the mining company: their Environmental Management Plan, the Environmental Impact Assessment Report, and all of this was rejected by the Ministry of the Environment. And to reject it, they relied heavily on this report, which is the analysis of potential environmental impact. So, in 2019\/2020, it was rejected.\u201d<\/p>\n
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The abuses continued, and one of the local organisations, referring to the report that rejected the mining company\u2019s project, said: \u201cThere is a lot of technical information in that report explaining why this cannot be done either. When the report was submitted, everyone realised it was used internally within the Ministry; it wasn\u2019t published anywhere, it was used for internal assessment by the Ministry of the Environment\u2019s team. The report shows that we also did everything \u2013 studies here on the reefs \u2013 because what we\u2019re trying to demonstrate is the importance of this ecosystem.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\nComplaints about the construction of the port and the exploitation of sensitive areas<\/strong><\/p>\n